

Ted Cohen, on the other hand, delves into current debates about metaphor. He considers in particular whether metaphors deemed successful actually present new meanings and considers also what it is to deny a metaphor. Finally and suitably, in “Macbeth Appalled,” we are left with the artistry of Stanley Cavell’s lyrical prose, not just as an adjunct to reflection, but as something that can become its trajectory.

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DE SOUSA, RONALD. *Emotional Truth*. Oxford University Press, 2011, xviii + 319 pp., \$60.59 cloth.

At least since the publication in 1987 of his first book, *The Rationality of Emotion*, Ronald de Sousa has been firmly established as one of the absolutely first-rate thinkers on the emotions. The recent publication of his book *Emotional Truth* (versions of each of the seventeen chapters have been previously published in various places) should thus be hailed by those seriously interested in the emotions. There is not enough space here to discuss everything in a volume as wide-ranging and remarkably impressive as *Emotional Truth*, but below is a quick and very rough summary of some of de Sousa’s central claims. Drawing on the etymological connections of the word ‘truth’ to words such as ‘trust’ and ‘truce,’ de Sousa claims that there is a generic notion of truth that has broader connotations (of fidelity, authenticity, and loyalty) than the concept of strict, propositional truth, which alone is sanctioned by contemporary philosophy; a true portrait, for example, is faithful, and a true friend loyal. Claiming then that there are two aspects to emotional truth, how well emotions reflect the world, as well as our own selves, de Sousa suggests that emotional truth can tell us about things (such as beauty, morality, love, death, sex, knowledge, desire, coherence, and happiness) essential to our existence as social beings. Emotions, he argues, can both ground and also sometimes undermine our values; when taken holistically, they serve as the ultimate judges of conflicting values.

Chapter 1 sets up the idea that strategic or practical rationality (for example, Pascal’s Wager and William James’s “The Will to Believe”) and epistemic rationality (for example, William Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”) are distinct frameworks and often conflict, in which case a third framework, axiological rationality, may arbitrate the conflict, even as it yields its own paradoxes. Emotional attitudes, de Sousa claims, justify the norms of axiological rationality and also settle conflicts between normative claims, assuming

emotions are perceptions of value. But these emotional dispositions must themselves be assessed holistically, in the broadest possible way. Chapter 2 begins with a useful classification of twenty-nine different views about emotions and suggests that cognitivism about emotions should be reconstrued on a perceptual model, at least some emotions being perceptions of value, rather than on a model involving belief. Claiming that at least some forms of cognitivism and noncognitivism about emotions are closer than has previously been thought, de Sousa then maintains an axiological holism, which holds that we need to achieve a holistic, reflective equilibrium of emotional responses when pitted against each other, also taking into account biological, social, and personal factors, and this is the closest we can come to reconstructing a notion of normative human nature. The heart of de Sousa’s overall claims is in Chapter 3, where de Sousa claims we get a certain notion of correspondence truth from kindergarten and proceeds to suggest a “generic” notion of truth that applies to emotions and desires and of which propositional truth is but one species. Chapter 4 goes on to claim that emotional truth, emotional rationality, and emotional authenticity tie in with each other rather than being completely separate virtues.

In Chapter 5, de Sousa cites evolution to doubt Aristotelian ideas of an intrinsic *telos* of human nature or a human essence. Instead, the old notion of living naturally while being guided by our emotions is reconstructed by appealing, once again, to axiological holism: while emotions in general constitute perceptions of value, they can be mistaken, and so we must appeal to our other emotional responses, including novel emotions in novel contexts, to achieve a reflective equilibrium here. In Chapter 6 (as well as in Chapters 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, and 17), de Sousa makes some claims of particular interest to aestheticians. In addition to the “black-and-white” emotions that play roles in action and choice and are favored by psychologists and biologists, de Sousa urges that we also recognize that some other emotions, such as those felt in aesthetic experience, are more subtle, contemplative “polychrome” experiences that enable us to *feel* rather than be necessarily disposed to action. Such a multidimensional view of emotions rests on a plurality of “valence-free values” and stresses emotional quality and at least some emotions mattering for their own sake. Aesthetic emotions, de Sousa holds, are the ones more likely to make life worth living even if they may play a little role in preserving it or in reproduction. Chapter 7 briefly stresses de Sousa’s sympathies toward a broadly Aristotelian view of the role of emotions in ethics, as opposed to Humean and Kantian views, and then suggests that emotions need to be in a sufficiently complex network of related items (such as other emotions, thoughts, preferences, principles,

values, reasons, and so on) to be of moral significance; while any single emotion can be morally significant, none can be so just by itself. Emotions reveal value but can also be assessed morally via achieving a reflective equilibrium, as urged earlier; de Sousa here recommends a vigilant irony that is constantly aware of the fallibility of our emotions and values. In Chapter 8, de Sousa rejects emotional foundationalism and instead suggests a naturalistic, holistic circle that is large enough to be virtuous. De Sousa also claims that while Western secular morality is focused on avoiding harm and also fairness and reciprocity, others have also stressed community, authority, and purity. Finally, moral values need not trump all others, and indeed nonmoral values (such as aesthetic, political, and religious values) may play a role in demarcating the moral domain.

Chapter 9 discusses epistemic feelings, which affect inference, cognition, and metacognition, and also deals with fear, greed, doubt, certainty, knowing, familiarity, and how oxytocin affects trust. In Chapter 10, de Sousa claims that there is no “correct” attitude to death. Chapter 11 deals with whether art is an adaptation, and de Sousa argues that Ellen Dissanayake’s and Frederick Turner’s claims to the effect, respectively, that art has biological origins and that it reflects the deep structure of the universe’s laws, are too strong. Instead, art may be a spandrel, something that had no biological role originally except as a side effect yet has come to be valued. In Chapter 12, de Sousa turns from visual art to literature, advancing a notion of individual possibility relative to particular persons at particular times, places, and situations that makes sense of the idea that the possible is part of the actual. Art and literature, he claims, can dislodge us from our ruts and thus expand our horizons. In particular, fiction can make us morally better if we are ready to reevaluate and thus “re-gestalt” things previously despised or admired and if one can *see oneself* as some character in the new scenario thrown up by the “re-gestalt” emotion.

Serendipity lies at the heart of desire, argues de Sousa in Chapter 13, and what we desire to get is often something we did not want. Chapter 14 briefly explores the suggestion that our idea of happiness varies with our circumstances, but that idea itself potentially conflicts with the claim that happiness is a matter of one’s character or personality rather than circumstances. De Sousa also sets out puzzles such as this one: does what I experience now matter more than what I will judge in the future in retrospect (which will not match my present judgment), or the other way around? Admitting that he has no principle for settling the issue, de Sousa eventually suggests that we should not dismiss chemical happiness lightly, even as we value commonsense wisdom and ancient

advice. In Chapter 15, de Sousa rejects traditional social categories of love as too limited and instead argues for multiplying these categories. Moving thus from the black and white to color, he suggests that not every person, every relationship, and every emotion can be classified as falling under some schema or the other; every loving relationship is particular in space–time and unique, as are the individuals involved. De Sousa urges instead that we think of love in terms of the aesthetics of the unpredictable and the multifarious. In Chapter 16, de Sousa claims that traditional romantic love makes impossible demands on us and so suggests something likely controversial: that romantic love be replaced by a certain kind of theater of love, a form of erotic play that is conscious, mutually consensual, self-consciously limited to the present, and not necessarily committed to any sort of subsequent relationship of any form. This, he claims, is a form of promiscuous love rather than promiscuous sex as such and is aesthetic, imaginative, honest, generous, attentive, temporary, and so on; some, however, will doubt whether de Sousa’s suggestion that such a theater of love be isolated from the rest of our lives and expectations is very realistic. Finally, Chapter 17 claims that while we often want emotional novelty, we also need some repetition for the novelty to be meaningful. New aesthetic experience can liberate us from tedious repetition, but we must transfer the sensibilities thus honed to our daily lives.

These claims made by de Sousa raise some concerns, to which I now turn. At least since Bertrand Russell, truth has been recognized as a property of *linguistic* items such as propositions, and so it is not clear why we should use truth in conjunction with nonlinguistic, mental states and processes such as emotions (even if these may involve something like propositions or judgments as one of their constituents); stretching the truth is not a good idea in general, nor is it clear that stretching the *concept* of truth is advisable. Almost all recent writers on the emotions would likely fully agree with de Sousa that emotions can indeed reveal or tell us things about *both* the world and ourselves; some emotions can be *accurate*, as Adam Morton, for example, has argued, or can be such that they fit the world and ourselves or are appropriate or right or befitting or justified or rational and so on, while some other emotions are not so. But it is not clear that stretching the concept of truth, as de Sousa wants, by appealing to an (allegedly) looser, generic concept of emotional “truth” does any extra work not already done by the alternative notions of emotional accuracy, fit, appropriateness, rationality, and so on. As for de Sousa’s examples of true images or portraits and true friends, one might wonder if these are (perhaps rhetorically useful and informative) metaphors where the appeal to truth might be paraphrased away in terms

involving, respectively, images or portraits that sufficiently resemble or correspond to their subjects and loyal or faithful friends.

Having summed up and offered some qualms about de Sousa's main claims, as any conscientious reviewer must try to do, I conclude by praising de Sousa's book, which thoroughly deserves high acclaim. De Sousa argues very persuasively, there being a lot right about his claims, and he writes clearly, eloquently, and often very wittily; witness the claim that he was a graduate student at a time when marijuana was part of the graduate curriculum, and de Sousa's insight that the old proverb "A rolling stone gathers no moss" is interpreted negatively by Europeans but positively by Americans. Practically every page drips with erudition, showing de Sousa's firm grasp of a vast amount of current literature not merely in various branches of philosophy (such as the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of science and biology, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and so on) but also in other disciplines such as psychology, biology, neuroscience, and cognitive science. *Emotional Truth* covers a lot of terrain very insightfully and yet is also a real pleasure to read, being thus among those rare books that both educate and delight. Readers should thank de Sousa for serving up a rich feast.

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BERGMANN, SIGURD. *In the Beginning Is the Icon: A Liberative Theology of Images, Visual Arts, and Culture*. Sheffield, UK: Equinox, 2009, 173 pp., numerous color illus., \$85.00 cloth.

This is an ambitious work that gently crosses established disciplinary boundaries. Through critical engagement with theories of the image, theologies of the icon and the aesthetic, and various theological, sociological, and anthropological accounts of the arts, Sigurd Bergmann seeks to forge a "contextual art theology" that grants to the visual arts a relatively independent place vis-à-vis traditional Christian theology. Accordingly, Bergmann offers an approach to theological analysis that attempts to revive the use of images within the domain of theological and religious reflection. He contends that theology in the modern West has tended toward "logocentric" constructions that prize the written and spoken word over more "eikoncentric," or image-based, approaches. "With regards to the history of Christianity," he writes, "the theological interpretation of images has a common ecclesiastical and philosophical ground closely related to Jewish and Hellenistic approaches. While the

Western Church developed a more catechetical iconology, in which images generally were perceived as positive, albeit in a reductionist sense as illustrations to the Holy Scripture[s] and the written dogmas of theologians, the Eastern Church developed a more ontological theology of icons, in which the intrinsic value of the visual media is recognized" (p. xv). Whatever we might think of Bergmann's historical account of image theologies between the East and West, these comments lead him to declare that "there is [now] an urgent need for ecumenical reflection over the inter-confessional historical similarities and divisions of a theology of images and its future ethical potential in a globalized and secularized world system" (p. xv). And this book is designed to meet this perceived need.

As an interdisciplinary project, *In the Beginning Is the Icon* is an extension of Bergmann's *Creation Set Free* (2005), a study begun in 1988 that attempted to address the global ecological crisis by way of an "ecological theology of liberation" founded on elements of Eastern Orthodox Trinitarian cosmology as well as contemporary expressions of theological and social liberationism. As this earlier work was concerned to provide a theological account of the ways human behaviors interconnect with their respective ecological contexts, so the present work seeks to maintain yet widen this inquiry, extending the analysis into the realm of the visual arts. Of interest here are, for example, questions of how "art for the sake of art" bears "on the religious hope about [the] liberation of the poor and the entire creation," and of how we might "develop a (visual) theology of art" situated within a contextual theological paradigm that is sensitive to the ways in which diverse forms of human sociality and physical place influence the production, experience, and consumption of images (p. 98). A contextual art theology will affirm "the independent expressive force of the image and the autonomy of visual arts" and be carried forward by the conviction that God is free to enact liberation within all sectors of creation through a wide range of means, including the visual image (p. 109). Moreover, it will carefully attend to the self-determined nature of pictures and the role they play in affecting diverse forms of human experience. "A theological approach to creativity and to visual arts," Bergmann says, "should be grounded in the creation and reality of images, and picture analysis should always be connected to the actual *experience* of seeing the image" (pp. 3–4). Presumably, he does not have in mind here the mere experience of the visual art-object as such; rather, he means that the visual art-object is at all points a potential site of divine liberative action. The main thrust of Bergmann's project is therefore oriented toward constructing a theological account of the visual arts that at once acknowledges their integrity